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Niggaz with knowledge is more dangerous than niggaz with guns 
They make the guns easy to get and try to keep niggaz dumb 
Target the gangs and graffiti with the Prop 21 ... 
I already know the deal but what the fuck do I tell my son? 
Talib Kweli2 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Associating with a gang member.  Check.  Group Photos with gang members.  
Check.  Method of dress.  Check.  Loitering/Riding with member.  Check.  As I run 
down the criteria used by the Oakland Police Department to classify gang members, 
associates, and sympathizers,3 I am struck by how many of the individuals I grew up 
with, who had no gang affiliation whatsoever, would be referred to the Cal/Gang 
database and tracked by the state of California as gang members.  Come to think of 
it, am I in this database? 
Weekend nights in San Jose for many young Chicanos/as meant going downtown 
and “cruising.” For my friends and I, it was no different.   Sometimes we had a car, 
                                                                
1J.D. Candidate, UCLA School of Law, 2004, Concentration in Critical Race Studies.  I 
would like to thank Monica Kane, Susan Westerberg Prager, and Devon Carbado for their 
invaluable help with this paper.  I would also like to thank Frank Valdez, Angela Harris, 
Margaret Montoya, and the staff of the Cleveland State Law Review for helping me make the 
most of this opportunity. 
2Talib Kweli, The Proud, on QUALITY (Rawkus Records 2002). 
3Criteria Used by Oakland Police Department to Classify Gang Members, Associates, and 
Sympathizers, at http://www.colorlines.com/waronyouth/Pages/opd4.html (last modified Mar. 
22, 2004). 
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but this time we didn’t, but no matter, we would walk up and down the packed 
boulevard in a modern reenactment of the Mexican courting rituals that had gone on 
for centuries in small towns in Mexico.  Dressed in the clothes that were the uniform 
of my generation of youth color (prior to their adoption by mainstream culture), we 
would spend the night looking for flashily dressed girls and at the flashier cars.  To 
us, the similarities in dress signified stylishness, but to the police, they were 
verification of what they already suspected because of our race: our membership in 
gangs. 
As always, the police were out in force to try to make sure there wasn’t any 
“trouble.” There was no way this was going to deter us from a Saturday night on the 
strip, but when we approached, the police stopped and forced us to produce 
identification.  Out came the cards they kept on them to record the information they 
would take from us.  They would take our names, home addresses, the names of 
those we were with, and any tattoos we had, in addition to taking our pictures.  We 
were sure that this information was being used for the gang database they kept.  If 
their criteria was anything like that used by the Oakland Police Department, I was 
probably a gang member in the eyes of the San Jose Police Department. 
Though accustomed to the routine, it still raised all our ire.  We would talk 
among ourselves, indignant that the police were allowed to do this. Do the police 
keep records of the tattoos of white youth?  Do the police stop white youth for no 
reason other than that they are white?4 Do the police use trivial infractions such as 
anti-cruising laws to harass white youth in their neighborhoods because they assume 
that the individuals are drug dealers or gang members?5  Do the police shoot white 
youth in the back just because they think they might get away?6 Why are we 
criminalized and treated more harshly just because of our race? 
                                                                
4Mexican appearance is an impermissible justification if it is the only factor, however, it 
can be used as one of many factors in the justification for a stop.  United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).   
5See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). The Court said that a pretextual stop 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as there was some underlying probable cause 
for the stop.  Id.  See also Devon W. Carbado, Eracing The Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 946, 1033 (2002) (claiming that the “Court recognizes Whren’s race to deny him 
remediation and de-recognizes his race to deny the “important” police function blackness 
performs as a proxy for suspicion”). Professor Carbado highlights the way that the Fourth 
Amendment ignores the effect that race has in many facets of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and delineates how this ignoring of purposeful erasure of race constructs a 
racialized conception of Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. 
6See Tennessee v. Gardner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Gardner, a slight 14 year old, fleeing from 
the scene of a home burglary was shot in the back and killed because he was presumed to be 
dangerous.  Id.  These questions raised in this paragraph all were part of the dialogue that my 
friends and I would have about our roles vis a vis the police state.  Although most law students 
probably only deal with issues such as this in the context of case analysis or in a hypothetical, 
I dealt with this in high school, when my friend was shot in the back by police as he tried to 
flee from his car.  These scenarios are debated and discussed because they form the lived 
experiences of young people of color, and become part of the context within youth of color 
situate themselves in the existing social structure. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss1/13
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For some time the Court has been moving toward a conceptualization of youth as 
being a group that needs policing and control.7  However, the rationale that mandates 
the level of control differs depending on which group of youth is to be controlled.8  
An analysis of the intersectionality of age, race, and gender demonstrates these 
differing conceptualizations of the necessary control and how it subordinates and 
criminalizes youth of color, and creates a racialized conception of youth.9 
Illustrating the way in which conceptions of race and crime shapes and is shaped 
by law is California’s Proposition 21.  Enacted in 2000, Proposition 21, also known 
as the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act,10 was the product of 
California’s direct democratic process through which voters are able to change the 
California Constitution through a simple majority vote.  The proposition system has 
been employed in California as a tool of majoritarian domination, subjugating 
communities of color.11  These racialized measures have been constructed in a race 
neutral manner, utilizing and reinforcing the discourse of colorblindness. 
Although the drafters construct the racial dialogue in this way, the racial effect of 
such laws is well known to them, and its racial impact is well documented.  The 
interest groups behind such legislation are cognizant of what messages will appeal to 
voters, and draft the legislation and the media campaigns surrounding them to garner 
the broadest support.12 Racialized tropes have been successfully deployed in the past, 
and the interest groups have capitalized on the racial appeal of this legislation 
through various discourses ranging from xenophobia to colorblindness, formal 
equality, and reverse racism. 
The drafters of these racialized propositions employ the rhetoric of 
colorblindness because it can withstand constitutional challenges under current Equal 
Protection jurisprudence. Thus, they can take advantage of the limited ways in which 
racially subordinating law can be contested.  Moreover, the rhetoric of 
colorblindness also works because it comports with the general societal idea of 
                                                                
7See Bd. of Educ. of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).  The Court ruled 
that random, suspicion less drug testing was permissible for high school students participating 
in after school sports.  Id.  See also Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional 
Rights? Keeping Order in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 104 (1996) 
(celebrating the increased power to control students that was authorized by recent Supreme 
Court decisions because it would make it difficult for schools to be institutions of social 
reconstruction). 
8Kenneth B. Nunn, The End Of Adolescence: The Child As Other: Race And Differential 
Treatment In The Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 707-09 (2002). 
9See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Women of Color at the Center:  Selections from the 
Third National Conference on Women of Color and the Law:  Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
1241, 1243 (1991) (discussing the necessity to analyze the way in which intersectionality 
shapes subordinating experience).  
10http://primary2000.ss.ca.gov/Voter Guide/Propositions/21yesarg.htm (on file with 
author). 
11See infra Sections II and III. 
12LYDIA CHAVEZ, THE COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA’S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
42-3 (1998).   
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formal equality,13 while still using a racialized conception of crime.  In this way, the 
law both reinforces and creates racial construction through its sanctioning and 
defining of the racial landscape. 
Thus, those contesting this legislation from an anti-subordination standpoint are 
left to determine and orchestrate innovative means of challenging these laws.  There 
is debate over what can be done to effectively challenge these attacks in the 
socio/political realm.  Conventional wisdom dictates that utilizing mainstream 
politics means utilizing social constructions with the greatest appeal to the largest 
mass of society.  However, often this does nothing to contest the underlying 
systematic conceptualizations of race.  Being forced to work within the dominant 
conceptualization of racial discourse allows for no adequate criticism of the ways in 
which the rhetoric of colorblindness is utilized for racial subjugation.  Thus, this 
creates a disjuncture between theory and practice, forcing social justice advocates to 
adopt a rhetoric that does not allow for a real contestation of the ideology that 
undergirds this subjugating conceptualization of race.14 
Part II address the ideological foundations of direct democracy and examine 
critically its ability to serve a democratic function.  I examine the founders’ rationale 
behind the decision not to employ a representative form of government, and look at 
direct democracy in California and the theoretical underpinning behind it.  I argue 
that direct democracy has been used to oppress minority groups, partly due to the 
undermining of the structural protections in a representative form of government and 
that further, in the case of California, the racial impact of direct democracy was 
conceived at the inception of the system.  Part III examines the socio-political 
landscape surrounding Proposition 21.  I examine how the proposition system in 
California has been used to subjugate racial minorities throughout its history.  Part 
IV highlights Proposition 21 and examine the discourse that surrounded youths, race, 
gangs, and crime at the time of the legislation and analyze the rhetoric employed in 
the campaign. Part V looks to how this legislation has been challenged, both through 
traditional litigation and through progressive tactics.  I evaluate the strategies’ 
liberatory potential and argue that creating greater transparency in racial dialogue is 
important from an anti-subordination standpoint and argue that this is necessary to 
mobilize and empower those most affected by these laws, to create the social change 
necessary to rectify racial injustice and contest the current discourse on race and 
class in society.  I conclude with some suggestions on how to best build coalitions 
and steps that need to be taken to move forward with the struggle. 
II.  IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
In 1911, as part of the Progressive reform movement in California, the initiative, 
referendum, and recall were added to the State Constitution, in large part to destroy 
                                                                
13Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, And Retrenchment: Transformation And 
Legitimation In Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1378 (1988) (defining 
Formal Equality as “the disappearance of these symbols of subordination” signaling “the 
demise of the rhetoric of white supremacy as expressing America’s normative vision”). 
14Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of 
Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 838-39 1995 (discussing the necessity to “name” 
racism, and directly engage white supremacy). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss1/13
2005] (E)RACING YOUTH 193 
the political influence of the Southern Pacific Railroad.15 A 1948 amendment to the 
California Constitution conceptualized a system that would allow for more accurate 
participation in the proposition system by the common citizen, and thus created 
safeguards such as the Single Subject Rule16 to ensure that the voters be able to 
decide on clear, specific and discrete changes to California law that have been 
properly presented before them.17  Despite this stated desire for greater public 
participation in the political process, one of the methods used to garner support for 
the proposition system was to enlist xenophobic and racist organizations.18 
The proposition system in the state of California operates as a form of 
superlegislature, since it can be used to alter the California Constitution.  
Consequently, the ability to make sweeping changes to the state government with a 
simple majority of votes means that the proposition plays a huge role in the creation 
of public policy.19  To get a proposition on the ballot in California, supporters must 
gather signatures form five percent of the registered voters in the state if it is a 
statutory initiative, and eight percent if it is a constitutional initiative,20  with the 
signatures often being collected by professional signature collection firms.21 Public 
knowledge about the propositions, and thus voter sympathies, are often developed 
through the use of mass media, with some groups spending tens of millions of dollars 
for media time to advance their agendas.22  There is no real limit on financial 
contributions to these campaigns, and thus the party that is able to raise the most 
resources will be in a good position to influence public opinion.23 
                                                                
15http://www.ss.ca.gov/prd/about_the_division/history.htm (on file with the author). 
16CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d). The single subject rule reads: “An initiative measure 
embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.” See 
generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA 
L. REV. 936 (1983) (arguing that the single subject rule serves neither the function of avoiding 
confusion by clarifying the issues or nor that of preventing logrolling). 
17http://www.aclunc.org/criminal/prop21-brief-sf.html (on file with the author). 
18DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1984). 
19David B. Magleby, Governing By Initiative: Let the Voters Decide?  An Assessment of 
the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 21 Table 1 (1995). 
20Id.  
21CHAVEZ, supra note 12, at 135. 
22See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1569 
(1990). For example, in 1988 $100 million dollars were spent on the battle over the various 
competing insurance reform propositions, the majority of which was spent by the insurance 
companies.  See also Becky Kruse, Comment, The Truth in Masquerade: Regulating False 
Ballot Proposition Ads Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 129, 141 
(2001). More recently, over $100 million was spent on a recent initiative allowing Indian 
gaming.   
23See Kruse, supra note 22 (comparing two articles that demonstrating that there is 
differing opinion on money in campaigns); BETTY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND THE 
GRASSROOTS 90-109 (1987) (finding in a study conducted of fifty ballot propositions between 
1976 and 1980 that the high spending side won eighty percent of the elections); Daniel H. 
Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
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The late Professor Julian Eule critiqued direct democracy, claiming that it lacks 
many of the essential power filters to stem the tyranny of the majority.24  During the 
founding of this country, the Federalists argued that a representative form of 
government alone would not be enough because they feared government leaders 
might prove too responsive to popular will and would still succumb to majority 
tyranny. To prevent such a situation, they divided the power among several 
branches,25 and came to see the adoption of the bill of rights as “another device for 
filtering majoritarian preferences,”26 and Professor Eule lists several filters to ward 
against majoritarian tyranny in the representative process.27 
Professor Eule considers direct democracy to be problematic, because although a 
rhetoric of formal equality has been adopted, there has been a continuation of 
racially oppressive legislation.28  Part of this is attributable to what Professor Charles 
Lawrence terms “unconscious racism.”29  Voters, though no longer making decisions 
on overtly racial basis, still are influenced by the racialized hegemony of this 
country’s culture.  Thus, even though formal racism has been disavowed, legislation 
that has a disparate racial impact is able to pass because the predominant 
construction of racism only condemns the overt mention of race, while containing no 
mandate that public and private decisions be made from an anti-subordination 
standpoint.  Professor Eule points to the then-recent passage of the waves of racist, 
xenophobic, English-only legislation by direct democratic plebiscites.30  Professor 
Derrick Bell has also been critical of direct democracy, claiming that despite its 
promise to include the voice of the common man, it has weakened the ability of 
minorities to participate in the political process because it allows racialized 
legislation to pass into law, unchecked by the representative process.31 
Professor Eule points to the problems of current equal protection law that limit 
the ability of racial minorities to challenge these racialized propositions.  Under 
                                                           
Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 519-47 (1982) (examining twenty-
five California propositions from 1968-1980 with heavy, one-sided spending and finding that 
the high spending side was successful for forty-six percent of initiative proponents and ninety 
percent of initiative opponents).  
24See Eule, supra note 22. 
25Id. at 1528. 
26Id. at 1530. 
27Id. at 1555-56. 
28Id. at n.223 (quoting Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1347 n. 62 (1988)). 
29Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987). Lawrence posits a connection 
between unconscious racism and the existence of cultural symbols that have racial meaning. 
He suggests that the “cultural meaning” of an allegedly racially discriminatory act is the best 
available analogue for, and evidence of, a collective unconscious that we cannot observe 
directly. 
30Eule, supra note 22, at 1567. 
31Derrick Bell, The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 9, 13-18 (1978).  
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss1/13
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Washington v. Davis disparate impact is not enough to trigger strict scrutiny under 
the Equal Protection Clause.32 Thus, because many of the propositions are 
constructed in a race neutral manner, they would be adjudicated using a rational 
basis test and are unlikely to be overturned.  Professor Eule suggested that 
propositions that negatively impact minority groups should be given a judicial “hard 
look when:” 
the people eschew representation, courts need to protect the Constitution's 
representational values. This approach might be called representation-
enforcement in contrast to John Ely's representation-reinforcement model 
for review of legislative efforts. Where the structure itself is unable to 
guarantee a hearing for a variety of voices or to prevent factional 
domination, courts must pick up the slack and ensure that the majority 
governs in the interests of the whole people.33 
However, this conceptualization has never been adopted by courts, leaving 
minorities to deal with an unchecked direct democracy that, in at least the case of 
California, has been used as a tool of racial subjugation. 
III.  CALIFORNIA’S RACIALIZED PROPOSITIONS 
California’s recent history has been littered with numerous examples of 
propositions that have either directly or indirectly affected the educational and social 
opportunities for people of color in California.  Proposition 14, which repealed 
California’s Fair Housing Act, was the first of these racialized propositions.34  Many 
later propositions have either directly or indirectly focused on youth of color. In the 
1978, California’s Proposition 13 limited the monies available to school districts by 
changing the ways property tax could be assessed. This had a disparate effect on 
children of color because they were overrepresented in public schools and thus were 
most drastically affected by the change in the law.35 
                                                                
32426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
33Eule, supra note 22, at 1559. 
34CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26; See Nisha Vayas, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Fair 
Housing Controversies of 1960s California (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author) 
35Martha S. West, Equitable Funding of Public Schools Under State Constitutional Law, 2 
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 279, 310 (1999). West writes, “I worry that wealthier white people 
simply do not want to pay for the education of poor children, many of whom are children of 
color. One of the problems we face in California is that the characteristics of the people who 
vote differ remarkably from the characteristics of the students who are enrolled in our public 
schools. In 1994-95, public school students were only 41% white, whereas the voters in 1996 
were 77% white. Voters in 1996 were 10% Latino, whereas public school students were 38% 
Latino in 1994-95. Voters were 4% Asian American; public school students were 8.2% Asian 
American. The discrepancy was not so great among African Americans: 6% of voters; 8.7% of 
public school students. The largest discrepancy between students and voters is among Latinos, 
due to the increasing number of Latino children in the public schools whose parents are not 
active voters, are not registered, or are not eligible to register because of immigrant status.”  
See generally Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Forging Our Identity: Transformative 
Resistance in the Areas of Work, Class, and the Law: Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
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In 1994, the passage of Proposition 187 harkened the beginning of the wave of 
propositions that would directly and dramatically affect communities of color in 
California.36  Proposition 187 was an attempt to limit the services and benefits 
available to undocumented persons, including undocumented children.  Some of its 
provisions included the denial of emergency medical services to undocumented 
persons, and the exclusion of undocumented children from public schools.37  It 
required many public agents including public school teachers to report suspected 
undocumented children.38 
While Proposition 187 was for the most part eviscerated in the federal courts by 
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson,39 its political success 
emboldened its supporters to continue pressing their agenda, and solidified the 
potential of the proposition system as a successful vehicle for the reactionary 
agenda.40  The rhetoric that was employed to support Proposition 187 was directed 
primarily at Latino immigrants, thereby reinforcing a racialized conceptualization of 
immigration status. The pro-Proposition 187 campaign capitalized the growing anti-
immigrant sentiment in a mid-recession California, using images of immigrants 
running unchecked across the Mexico-California border and other rhetoric centering 
on the loss of jobs and threat to the economy that would supposedly come with 
continued immigration from Latin America.41  While Proposition 187 may have 
created an existing backlash against the Republican party and certain prominent 
proponents of the measure,42 it also revealed the usefulness of nationalistic, 
xenophobic, and racialized discourse to build support for conservative legislation.43 
The passage of Proposition 209 in 1996 effectively ended affirmative action for 
racial minorities in California’s public educational institutions.  Ironically titled the 
“California Civil Rights Initiative,” this amendment to the California Constitution 
used rhetoric of colorblindness, meritocracy, and reverse racism to appeal to 
California voters.  The proponents of this campaign legitimated their agenda using 
concepts of formal equality, thus billing the proposition as being anti-racist because 
                                                           
Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1237 
(2000) (Commenting on Proposition 13’s particularly onerous consequences for Latinas/os). 
36CHAVEZ, supra note 12, at xi.  
37Id. at 37. 
38Id. 
39997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The court granted summary judgment to the 
initiative opponents, in part, where federal immigration law directly preempted the initiative 
provisions, and where federal law and the state regulation were in conflict. The court 
continued the preliminary injunction that prevented implementation because the evidence was 
in conflict as to whether several provisions were totally or partially preempted by conflicts 
with federal law. 
40CHAVEZ, supra note 12, at 179. 
41Nancy Cervantes, et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in the Aftermath of Proposition 
187, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 5-6 (Fall, 1995). 
42A.G. Block, The Legacy of Proposition 187 Cuts Two Ways: Democrats Can’t Count on 
the Fear Tactic Forever, L.A. TIMES, April 7, 2002, at M2. 
43CHAVEZ, supra note 12, at 40. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol52/iss1/13
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of its colorblind stance.44  The proponents of the proposition described it and 
themselves as antiracist, creating a discourse that labeled their opponents as racist 
whenever they stressed the proposition’s racial impact.45  Constructing race 
consciousness as being equal to racism was a strategy that proved very useful in 
passing this amendment. 
Among Proposition 209’s opponents, there was a split in the ideology of how to 
contest the construction of race-consciousness as racism. Some argued that they 
should equate proponents of the proposition with David Duke and other overt and 
uncontestable racists.46 However, others felt it was better to adopt language that 
utilized the dominant paradigm of formal equality, and argue that affirmative action 
was still necessary to achieve this goal, akin to President Clinton’s, “Mend it, don’t 
end it” rationalization for affirmative action.47  This indecision about how to 
construct race and racism led to the lack of a coherent message that could adequately 
contest the pro-Proposition 209 campaign.48 
Also successful was California’s Proposition 227.  Billed as “English for Our 
Children,” this proposition also won by a landslide.49  This proposition aimed to end 
bilingual education in California.  While the proposition was ostensibly about 
providing a better education for all children, many scholars and community leaders 
argued that it would in fact have a detrimental impact on children of limited English 
proficiency, eliminating programs that had been in place to provide education for 
children and replacing it with legislation that was proposed by individuals with no 
educational experience or expertise.50  Some have argued that the animating purpose 
of laws such as this that limit the breadth of linguistic freedom are rooted in a 
nativist philosophy that disenfranchises other language speakers and posits them as 
un-American.51 In this way language serves as a proxy for race, and racializes 
language and linguistic ability.52 
                                                                
44Id. at 187-89, 217-22. 
45Id. at 187. 
46Id. at 226-30. 
47Id. at 155. 
48Lawrence, supra note 14. 
49Johnson, supra note 35, at 1227 (reporting that Proposition 227 passed by a margin of 
sixty-one to thirty-nine percent). 
50CHAVEZ, supra note 12, at 46-7. Proposition 227 was drafted and supported by 
businessman, Ron Unz, who was also a financial supporter of Proposition 209. 
51Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural 
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 369-70 (1992). Perea argues that 
current official English laws symbolize the rejection of this nation’s Hispanic heritage and 
culture, a heritage legal history amply bears out.  This heritage predates the English in some 
areas of the United States and remains vitally alive. Official English laws symbolize the 
rejection of the other non-core cultures of recent immigrants and Native Americans. Proof of 
the nativist meaning of the official English symbol lies in the history of the movement and in 
the distress, anger, and threat its proponents express in response to the mere presence of 
several languages on voting ballots. The animating premise of the official English movement 
is that Hispanic people, and their language, do not belong within the concept of what is 
American. The movement’s demand for disenfranchisement, its rejection of Spanish and other 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
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IV.  PROPOSITION 21 
When they be speaking in code words about crime and poverty 
Drugs, welfare, prisons, guns and robbery 
It really means us. 
Dead Prez53 
 
On March 7th, 2000, over sixty percent of voters approved California’s 
Proposition 21, titled the “Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act.”54  
One of the major provisions in this proposition involved a change in the waiver 
procedure used to prosecute juveniles as adults.  Previously, prosecutors could file a 
“fitness” hearing in which a judge would determine whether or not to try juveniles as 
adults.  Proposition 21 allows prosecutors to circumvent the “fitness” hearing and to 
directly charge youth as young as fourteen years old as adults.55  Under some 
circumstances, Proposition 21 even confers mandatory adult jurisdiction for certain 
offenses.  Finally, Proposition 21 allows for increased surveillance, tracking, and 
invasion of privacy for “Gang Members,” by allowing the use of "wiretaps" against 
known or suspected gang members and requiring anyone convicted of a gang-related 
offense to register with local law enforcement agencies.  The measure increases the 
extra prison terms for gang-related crimes to two, three, or four years. However, if 
they are serious or violent crimes, the new extra prison terms would be five and ten 
years, respectively. In addition, this measure adds gang-related murder to the list of 
"special circumstances" that make offenders eligible for the death penalty. It also 
makes it easier to prosecute crimes related to gang recruitment.56 
As mentioned above, Proposition 21 was passed as part of a wave of racialized 
propositions.  White Californians consistently supported propositions 187, 209, and 
227, while minorities opposed them, often staging protests and rallies in the 
campaign against them.57 As part of then-Governor Pete Wilson’s push for a 
presidential campaign, he and his political allies once again mobilized anti-minority 
                                                           
American languages for voting purposes, sends a powerful message of rejection and exclusion 
to certain segments of the American citizenry, defined by national origin. It is a familiar 
message of rejection experienced by unpopular groups in this society. This message, targeted 
principally at Hispanics, and the resulting discouragement of non-English-speaking citizens 
from voting, constitutes a serious defect in the political process of the kind that merits 
heightened judicial scrutiny. 
52Johnson, supra note 35, at 1230 
53Dead Prez, Propaganda, on LETS GET FREE (Loud Records 2000). 
54Mark Gladstone, Proposition 21: Authorities Fear Fallout but Weigh Options: State and 
county officials brace for costly impact on courts and prisons as more juvenile lawbreakers 
are charged as adults, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at A3. 
55See ALEXIS HARRIS, SENDING “SOPHISTICATED” CHILDREN “UPSTAIRS”: THE SOCIAL, 
LEGAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY JUVENILE WAIVER PROCEEDINGS 8 
(2002); Jennifer Taylor, Note, California’s Proposition 21: A Case of Juvenile Injustice, 74 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 983, 990 (2002). 
56http://www.lao.ca.gov/initiatives/2000/21_03_2000.html (on file with author). 
57CHAVEZ, supra note 12, at 198-201. 
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sentiment.  Minority youth were an easy target, and public opinion polls showed that 
youth of color were perceived as the cause of the explosion of violent youth crime. 
The passage of Proposition 21 was in part due to a perception of rising youth 
crime, and cities under assault by street gangs.58  At the time of the campaign for 
Proposition 21, sixty-two percent of the American public believed that the youth 
crime rate was rising, despite youth crime being at its lowest level in decades.59  This 
misperception was likely created by several factors, especially by an over-reporting 
of violent crime.  From 1990 to 1998, the homicide rate was down thirty-three 
percent, while the network coverage of homicide rose four hundred and seventy-
three percent.60  There was also an overrepresentation of interracial crime where the 
victim was white, increasing the perception that people of color are responsible for 
the violence against whites and thereby racializing crime.61  Youth are also 
overrepresented in the coverage of violent crime.  In California, sixty-eight percent 
of stories about violent crime involved youth, while only fourteen percent of arrests 
for violent crime involve young people.62 
The media representations of young Black males as “criminals” that began in the 
1960s and 1970s still exist, but now Latino males are racialized as criminal as well.63  
This racialized perception of youth violence is mirrored in the decisions to move 
youth out of the juvenile justice system.  While Blacks under eighteen years old 
make up twenty-six percent of all juvenile arrests, they constitute fifty-eight percent 
of all youth sent to state prisons.  The Cal/Gang database and other gang monitoring 
systems are notorious for overrepresenting the number of youths actually involved 
with gang activity.64  The factors used in the Cal/Gang database create a greater 
likelihood that minorities, who are more likely to grow up in environments where 
gangs are present, will be registered in the gang database, regardless of actual 
involvement in gang activity.  In this way, the racialization of crime is furthered, 
constructing youth of color, regardless of actual gang affiliation, as gang members 
just because of their lived socioeconomic experience. 
This racialized conceptualization of crime and gang membership functions to 
subordinate youth of color by criminalizing them on a de facto presumption of gang 
membership.65 The generalized conception of gangs is of teen and young adult 
males, sharing a group identity, occupying a certain territory, and engaging in 
                                                                
58Jane Twomey, Media fuels fear about youth crime; Perception: If juvenile crime is at its 
lowest in decades, why do so many Americans believe otherwise? BALTIMORE SUN, May 13, 






64Ryan Pintado-Vertner, How Is Juvenile Justice Served? Racially biased system just 
sweeps troubled youths under the rug, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2000, at 1/Z1. 
65Lori Dorfman & Vincent Schiraldi, Off Balance: Youth, Race & Crime in the News, at 
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/media/media.html. 
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criminal activity.66    They are generally from poor neighborhoods and consist 
overwhelmingly of youth of color.67  While most youth gang members are of color, 
this does not mean that most youth of color are in gangs.  Recent reports show that 
often there is a huge amount of over reporting of gang identification by police.  
Police in Los Angeles classify forty-seven percent of the city’s African-American 
youth as gang members, and Denver classifies sixty-seven percent as gang 
members.68  This over reporting and over classifying of youth of color as “gang 
members”69 reflects the way in which gang membership is racialized.  While 
nowhere near this percentage of youth are involved in gang activity, this evidences 
the fact that youth of color are perceived to be involved in gangs. 
Studies of youth transfers to the adult system reveal further racial disparities.  A 
recent study of the racial disparities in the criminal justice system in California prior 
to the changes brought about by Proposition 21 reveal that there are “imbalances that 
are stark and vast.”70 It showed that minority youths are 8.3 times more likely than 
white youths to be sentenced by an adult court.71 Some argument can be made that 
this disparity is due in part to minority youth being arrested more often for violent 
crime.  Part of the reason for this is due to minority youth being 2.7 times more 
likely than white youths to be arrested for a violent felony, though part of this racial 
disparity is because decisions to arrest are often made on a racialized basis.72  
However, once arrested, minority youth arrested for violent crime are 3.1 times more 
likely than white youth arrested for violent crime to be transferred to adult court.73 
Thus, there is a much greater disparity in the sentencing that white and minority 
youth receive for similar offenses. 
Proposition 21 demonstrates and augments the racialization of youth status.  The 
inter sectionality of youth, race, and gender is demonstrated in light of the 
differential treatment that youth of color receive. The criteria that judges used prior 
to the passage of Proposition 21 in determining “fitness” for the juvenile system also 
demonstrate the racialization of youth status.74  The underlying concept of the 
juvenile justice system is that youth lack the full moral culpability that adults possess 
                                                                
66Kim Strosnider, Anti Gang Ordinances After City of Chicago v. Morales: The 
Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the Criminal Law, 39 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 101, 105 (2002). 
67Id. at 105-06. 
68Id. at 106, n.40 (citing the Brief of Amicus Curiae Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood 
Safty et al.). 
69Joan Moore, Gangs, Drugs, and Violence, in GANGS: THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF 
CONTEMPORARY YOUTH GANGS IN THE UNITED STATES 27-28 (Scott Cummings & Daniel J. 
Monti eds., 1993). 
70Mike Males & Dan Macallair, The Color of Justice: An Analysis of Juvenile Adult Court 
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because they are not fully mature and are still in the process of developing.75  Thus, 
the focus of the juvenile justice system is on rehabilitation for these developing 
individuals who have gone astray.  To be considered unfit for this system, juveniles 
must be considered fully developed individuals who are fully culpable for their 
actions, and thus irredeemable and unworthy of a system designed for rehabilitation. 
Although the criteria used by judges under the previous system appeared to be 
race-neutral on their face, they were, in fact, racialized. Here, the process of judicial 
waiver set unrecognized boundaries for decision making, and delimit decision 
making in a way that that enforces racial hierarchy. In a directed manner, judges 
utilized criteria for judicial waiver that reinforced the racialization of certain 
attributes because of their potential for overselection for youth of color.76  Assuming 
gang affiliation connotes sophistication, the emphasis on drug crimes, and court’s 
importance of “good families” and strong school attachment overselects for youth of 
color. These factors could easily be read to mean that the youth that possess them 
need extra rehabilitation because they have not had the support networks non-
similarly situated youth have had, instead youth of color they are disproportionably 
lock up. 
The courts differentiate between youth, decreeing that some are not worthy of 
rehabilitation due to their “sophistication.” In this way the courts and the legal 
system construct a racialized conception of youth.  By “sophisticating” or placing the 
full moral culpability that is reserved for adults on some youth, they are creating 
differing categories of youth.  By making these sophistication-based determinations 
using criteria that overselects for the socioeconomic realities of youth of color, they 
are racializing the concept of youth.  Youth of color lose the conceptualization of 
being morally redeemable and worthy of rehabilitation. 
There is little reason to think that the modification of the waiver system under 
Proposition 21, which allows prosecutors to directly file charges against youth in the 
adult system, will reduce the racial disparities, rather, several factors will most likely 
exacerbate them.  (The ability of overtly political agents to file adult charges directly 
allows for politics, rather than other criteria, to be the determining factors.)  As 
demonstrated, public opinion about crime and race means that pressure will be on 
prosecutors to sentence these youth severely. Previously, youth of color were 
overrepresented in those youth who had fitness hearings and were subsequently 
determined to be fit.  If prosecutors are allowed to directly file charges against youth 
in adult court, the check of the fitness hearing will be removed; thus, these youth of 
color will most likely be sentenced in adult court, exacerbating the number of youth 
in the adult prison system.77 
                                                                
75Id. at 4-5. 
76See Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of 
Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L. J. 1717, 1820 (2000) (discussing the institutional, path 
racism that judges would use in their selection of grand jurors).  
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V.  CHALLENGES 
A.  Court Challenges 
The first youth to be charged as an adult through the direct prosecutorial waiver 
was a sixteen year old charged with murder for fatally wounding a sixty-seven year 
old woman in a drive-by shooting that was allegedly meant for a rival gang 
member.78  However, the first constitutional challenge to Proposition 21 came from a 
less likely source.  The challenge came in Manduley v. Superior Court,79 a case in 
which several white teenagers attacked the Latino residents of a makeshift labor 
camp east of Del Mar, California. The youth were charged with beating several 
victims who were in their 60s and 70s, with clubs and metal rods, and shooting them 
with a pellet gun while shouting racial epitaphs. Two of the youth involved had their 
cases adjudicated through the juvenile justice system, while the other two who were 
deemed most culpable were charged as adults and sentenced to ninety days each in 
state correctional facilities.80  The parents appealed unsuccessfully. 
This case highlighted the racialization of Proposition 21.  One of the parents of 
the Manduley defendants, Debra Manduley, claims she did not understand what the 
proposition was really about, but now she feels the measure is unjust.81  Op-ed 
commentaries from the public in response to her claim pointed out that she and other 
white parents just did not realize that the law could be applied to their (white, hate 
crime perpetrating) children. They supported what they believed was a measure 
against violent and gang related (Black and Latino) youth.82  Although there may 
well have been confusion about what this measure would do,83 the overwhelming 
majority vote to pass the proposition can easily be read as a demonstration of the 
majoritarian will to pass a racialized measure.84  It was a community expression of 
who is considered a unredeemable, adult criminal, and who is considered to be a 
youth who made a mistake and just needs some guidance to get back on the right 
track.  Here, the parents of these white youth felt that their children deserved 
rehabilitation and special consideration because they were young, despite the overt 
racism that motivated the attack. This is a far cry from the conceptualization of what 
constitutes the perceived youth crime epidemic, in which minority youth are 
perceived as vicious, irredeemable criminals. 
The Manduley defendants appealed the rulings on several grounds, including 
separation of powers, the single subject rule, due process, and equal protection.  
They were unsuccessful in their appeal, effectively shutting off further litigation in 
                                                                
78TAYLOR, supra note 55, at 984. 
79104 Cal. App. 2d 140 (2001). 
80Tony Perry, Teens Get Jail for Hate Crime Attack, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2002, at 12.   
81Alex Roth, Teen-Ager Charged in Rampage Speaks Out; Youth Calls Role in Attack on 
Latino Workers Minor, S.D. UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 1, 2001, at B1. 
82Perico Diaz, Opinion editorial, Justice is Cruel When it Hits Home, S.D. UNION-
TRIBUNE, Feb. 9, 2001, at B11. 
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these areas.85  The California Supreme Court found there were no grounds to even 
bring an Equal Protection Claim. However, even if they had been able to, they most 
likely would have been unsuccessful due to the current nature of Equal Protection 
jurisprudence.  Currently, a facially neutral law can only trigger strict scrutiny if it is 
shown that there was the intent to discriminate; a disparate impact is insufficient.  
Thus, it would be difficult to trigger this stricter standard of review that would likely 
be necessary to overturn the law.  Under the rational basis test that would be used, 
the law would most likely be upheld.  This lesser standard would be used despite the 
racialized motivation behind the passage of this legislation.  While the proposition 
utilized racialized concepts of such as “youth crime” and “gang relation” that 
effectively act as proxies for race, these are insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.  
Thus, despite the racialized nature of the proposition, and the racialized motivation 
for its passage, opponents would most likely fail in bringing an Equal Protection 
challenge. 
However, if a judicial “hard look” would be given to this legislation because of 
its disparate impact on subordinated minorities, the law might be invalidated.86  If the 
court were to “enhance their sensitivity to the quality of suspectness”87 then the use 
of racialized concepts such as gang status, or definitions of youth criminality might 
be sufficient to deem Proposition 21 as attempting to utilize a “suspect 
classification.” This is unlikely to happen given the current conceptualization of race 
and racism.  
While the California Supreme Court rejected all of the major constitutional 
challenges to Proposition 21 put before it,88 two possible choices for Court 
challenges remain.  The prosecutorial waiver provision can still be challenged 
through a separation of powers argument,89 and the gang affiliation provisions may 
still be able to be challenged through the vagueness doctrine.90 
B.  Political Challenges 
California is already a majority-minority state,91 and, by 2025, Latinos are 
projected to be a near majority.92  This provides some hope that the initiative process 
will no longer be a tool that can be used to effectively subjugate minority groups. 93 
With no one group constituting a majority of the population, it may become more 
difficult to pass such divisive legislation.   However, several obstacles remain for this 
to be a viable option. 
                                                                
85TAYLOR, supra note 55, at 1016-17 (“The court rejected a multipronged attack on the 
juvenile justice measure, including claims that it violated separation of powers doctrine, that it 
deprives juveniles of due process of law, and that it violates the Equal Protection Clause.”).   
86Eule, supra note 22, at 1533.  
87Id. at 1568. 
88TAYLOR, supra note 55, at 1019. 
89Id. 
90See generally Strosnider, supra note 66. 
91http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf  p.98 (on file with author). 
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Historically, there has been low voter power within the Latino community.94  
There are a myriad of social factors that contribute to the historically low minority 
voter participation.  Latinos are overrepresented in the lower ends of the socio-
economic scale, and this contributes to them having much lower educational 
achievement than the general population.  Both of these factors correlate with low 
voter turn out.95  Latino population growth is in part fueled by immigration, both 
documented and undocumented, thus many Latinos who are affected by these laws 
have no voice in elections.  Latinos are also overrepresented in felony convictions,96 
which  effectively bar those convicted from being able to participate in the political 
process through voting.97  The passage of Proposition 21 means that Latinos youth, 
who are overrepresented in both the juvenile justice system and the judicial waiver 
process,98 will have a significant number of their youth transferred into the adult 
criminal justice system and convicted of felonies, thereby ending their ability to vote 
before they ever are eligible to participate.99 
Furthermore, there are economic hurdles to be overcome for progressives 
contesting racialized propositions. The supporters of such propositions are often very 
well funded. For example, Proposition 21 was funded by the Hilton Corporation, 
Chevron, Pacific Gas & Electric, Unocal 76, San Diego Gas & Electric and others.100  
Even if there were a progressive voter base large enough to successfully contest the 
passage of these racialized propositions, the financial realities of trying to mobilize 
such a population create in contesting the legislation. 
These realities disadvantage grassroots organizations because, as stated 
previously, just getting a proposition on the ballot requires a large investment of 
manpower and money to collect the necessary signatures.  Most grassroots 
organizations lack the resources to mount a successful signature garnering campaign.  
Further, the need for media access to mount an effective campaign limits the 
viability of utilizing the proposition system to effectuate progressive social change.  
Access to mass media requires a significant amount of money, and this poses a 
problem for low income groups, effectively limiting access to this supposedly more 
                                                                
94CHAVEZ, supra note 12, at 36. 
95Kim Cobb, Americans Uninspired by Election  HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 29, 2000, at 
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96http://www.nccd-crc.org/ (on file with author). 
97Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Disenfranchisement-A Race Neutral Punishment for Felony 
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directly responsive form of governance to those segments of the population with 
financial leverage.  Thus, while the proposition system is perceived to be a 
movement closer to direct democracy, access to shaping the political agenda is 
delineated according to socio-economic status. 
Even if these financial hurdles could be overcome, there remains the problem of 
how to garner public support for counterstrategies to the legislation.   Two strategies 
are available to groups hoping to contest this legislation.  One possible way is to 
shape the discourse so as to appeal to the greatest possible number of likely voters to 
hopefully defeat the legislation.   Under this system, shaping the discourse in such a 
way as to appeal to the broadest possible population means adopting the dominant 
paradigm of racial construction in order to win the broadest possible appeal by 
bringing together those who oppose the subordinating laws despite differing interests 
or ideologies.101   While this may be effective in ensuring short-term victory, this is 
in fact problematic because it does not allow the dominant, subjugating discourses of 
race and racism to be contested in a meaningful way.  Rather, by positing the 
discourse within the rhetoric of colorblindness, it merely reinforces this 
conceptualization, allowing the space to remain for this subordinating 
conceptualization of race, while reinforcing its legitimacy. 
Thus, for social change to occur we must articulate a counterhegemonic concept 
of race, the focus of which is anti-subordination.  This runs into difficulty because 
concepts of racism that disavow colorblindness are delegitimated.  Under this 
system, individuals wishing to contest racialized legislation by addressing the racial 
impact of this legislation have been marginalized and perceived as being 
counterproductive.  Students wishing to contest the purported ethics of 
colorblindness undergirding Proposition 209 by attempting to highlight former 
Klansman David Duke’s support for its passage were deemed to be extremists, and 
labeled as “Stupid Students.”102 
This conceptualization of more progressive groups as extremist comports with 
the dominant ideal of colorblindness.  To employ the concept of race in contesting 
this facially race neutral legislation directly confronts these ideals.103  This 
confrontational discourse has been discredited in the dominant hegemony for some 
time now, and the voices that espouse it have been marginalized.104  For this reason, 
contestations of this legislation that attempt to address its racialized nature in their 
discourse become discredited due to the “colorblind” and “race-neutral” majoritarian 
conceptualization as the acceptable racial discourse.  Groups looking to voice the 
racialized nature of this legislation find their voices silenced as extreme, and thus, no 
adequate contestation of this legislation can occur, because the only voices 
legitimated are those operating under the “colorblind” mode of discourse, which 
offers no effective contestation to the current conceptualizations of race and crime 
which are shaping the dominant hegemony that undergirds the support for these 
racialized proposition. 
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Part of the difficulty in formulating an effective challenge to the dominant 
conceptualization of race is due to the discourse that has been developed through 
mainstream media.  The way in which dialogue is constructed does not leave room 
for complex contestations of current racial paradigms.105  Current mass media relies 
heavily on the use of quick, digestible, and attention-garnering forms of 
communication that do not allow for any sophistication of information or foster any 
kind of reflection on the ideas presented.106  This simplification of discourse is 
problematic because it enables the dominant hegemony to continue by eliminating 
the viability of counterhegemonies.107  Thus, it becomes difficult to shift the dialogue 
using a medium that does not allow for critical reflection. 
C.  Theories on Alternate Contestations 
A true contestation would mandate that a differing view of race and racism be the 
cornerstone of any anti-subordination movement, but as stated above, this will be 
difficult to do because neither the society at large nor the legal system, has adopted 
this conception of race and racism. 108  Courts very rarely are solely responsible for 
social change.109  Even if they are acting as the tail end of agents for social change, 
their gains are easily stripped away due to shifting alliances of interests and changing 
social pressures.110 
However, some have suggested that the ineffectiveness of traditional legal 
avenues necessitates attorneys adopting new and innovative strategies, such as the 
attorney becoming a facilitator of a community empowerment contest racially 
subordinating laws such as this.111  Part of what must unfold is a grand scheme of the 
structure of institutions so that they can create a viable alternate vision of social 
institutions.112  This conceptualization must be ingrained into the practice of anti-
subordination lawyering, thus shaping the choices of legal strategies and discourses 
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to be utilized by social change advocates.113  Under this paradigm, it would be 
antithetical to adopt the rhetoric of colorblindness because in the end it would not 
challenge the existing social structure, rather it would only serve to reinforce it.114  
Professor Gerald Lopez points out: 
colorblind, radical populism never has been what it was made out to be.  
At some basic level, it is incoherent.  In the name of effective coalition 
building, it tries to define out of existence the very differences-gender, 
ethnic, class, ideological-that define and give life to politics of all sorts.  
That’s how it can present itself (and be marketed) as a political stance for 
everyone, an ideology that goes down easily.  Ultimately, too, that it 
serves most often to affirm, not to challenge the status quo.115 
In order to contest Proposition 21’s racialization of youth and crime, progressive 
attorneys must eschew this rhetoric and instead take an anti-subordination standpoint 
in the manifestation of challenges.  There must be the creation of alternate visions.  
The concept of political race116 is useful in both contesting this racialization and as 
an organizing concept. This form of race consciousness seeks to address the 
racialization of social institutions. 
Dissatisfied with the way that the status quo was being legitimated, activists are 
attempting to establish contestations of the dominant ideologies of colorblindness 
and meritocracy.   Recently, student interveners in Grutter v. Bollinger117 filed a 
separate motion to intervene because they felt that the ideology surrounding the 
University of Michigan’s arguments relied too heavily on traditional arguments 
based on the diversity rationale.118  Instead of emphasizing the rationales for 
affirmative action that currently carry the most saliency with the court,119 they 
offered an alternate contestation120 with a focus on anti-subordination that does not 
reinforce the existing constructions of race and racism in this society.121 The 
development of this counterhegemony through student action in the form of days of 
action, panel discussions, teach-ins, and weeks of education surrounding affirmative 
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action,122 constitutes a form of praxis, incorporating theoretical understandings of 
race and racism developed through critical race theory and other theoretical 
disciplines, and incorporates their underpinnings into how legal contestations will be 
shaped. 
Perhaps most importantly, this counterhegemony is being used as a form of 
liberatory pedagogy, where the lived experiences of students shape and direct the 
movement.123  This student participation develops a “critical awareness of their role 
as Subjects of the transformation.”124  Proposition 21, instead of serving as a moment 
of defeat and dissolution, has been a rallying point for youth of color and their allies.  
In the San Francisco Bay Area, mobilized by the repugnancy of Proposition 21, 
organized a campaign to fight back against the burgeoning prison-industrial complex 
in Oakland that was gearing up to build a new, massive, juvenile detention center.125 
A critical consciousness is formed through the active struggle against a juvenile 
justice system that overwhelmingly disadvantages youth of color.  “Through hip-hop 
and spoken word, smart media advocacy, art, traditional street outreach, student 
activism, multiracial alliances, and creative coalition building” youth of color utilize 
“sophisticated strategies that young activists of color have developed to use power-
building as a means of winning transformative social change.”126  Through this 
resistance, centered on a reconceptulization of existing power structures, the youth in 
this movement rename social relations by recognizing their own agency. Eschewing 
the rhetoric of colorblindness, they offered up contestations of racial relations that 
utilize race consciousness as a tool to overthrow white supremacy and racial 
hierarchy. 127 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
So what do I tell my son?128 
 
What do we tell our daughters and sons, sisters and brothers, students and 
friends?  Only that the reality now is not one we named.  The rhetoric of 
colorblindness hollow in our ears, and its underlying rationales are subordinating us.  
Tell them, it is ok to say so, and say it to whoever will listen.  We let them know that 
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their experiences are valid, and that they have the tools to make sense of it all.  Tell 
them:  Name yourself. 
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